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Accommodating Science to External
Demands: The Emergence
of Dutch Toxicology
Peter Groenewegen
Free University
Hybrid scientific fields consist of a collection of knowledge-producing and -utilising
organisations, fulfilling a dual role of providing specific knowledge services as well as
contributing to increased scientific understanding. In this article, the processes that gov-
ern scientific knowledge production in hybrid scientific fields are explored. While such
sets of organisations are targeted in science policy as receivers of resources, as well as
providers of services and other knowledge products, attention in science studies is all but
lacking. Data from a study on toxicology as a representative of public health sciences are
used. The author will focus on the effects on scientific research and its organisational
relations by discussing three social processes relevant to knowledge production, prob-
lem choice, resource distribution, and reputational control.
Different commentators have observed that themanner inwhich scientific
research is organised is changing. The institutional framework for choices in
research is shifting from peer-controlled academic choices to allocation of
funds through programmes and projects in which responsibilities for choice
of research problems are shared with outsiders (Blume 1987; Geiger 1988;
Rip 1990). Thus, scientific autonomy is significantly reduced or surrendered
in externally coordinated mission-oriented institutes (Whitley 1984b). The
current transformations in the conduct of science have been largely discussed
in terms of policy and normative concerns about such institutional changes.1
A major conclusion has been that academic research is, to an increasing
extent, attached to social or economic problems.2 Three important factors
help to explain this shift. First, these changes have an internal origin, espe-
cially in the natural sciences, as crucial instrumentation became more costly
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and had to be shared to a larger extent. Therefore, changes take place at the
level of fields or specialties of science, but such reasons do not hold for all
fields of scientific inquiry to the samedegree (Gillmor 1986).A secondmajor
reason resides in contextual changes. Policy needs formulated by corpora-
tions, state agencies, and others promoted scientific research in various new
settings.3 These changes led to a motley collection of research programmes,
research centres, commercial research and development (R&D) firms, and
scientific institutes to accommodate science to the demands posed by techno-
logical innovation and the solution of social problems.An increasing number
of scientists, therefore, face organisational constraints on problem choice.4
Third, scientists not only reacted to external interference, some groups of sci-
entists also proactively engaged in efforts directed at organising science for
social and economic goals (Fujimura 1988; Studer and Chubin 1980). Thus,
changes in the research system may be attributed as well to a more entrepre-
neurial attitude of scientists and cannot be analysed exclusively as a unidirec-
tional process (e.g., the influence of external pressures or funding) (Cozzens
1986). The combination of these three processes can be summarised broadly
as a significant change of the relations between research system and the
social environment (Rip 1990).
The type of organisational changes indicated above can be expected to
have an impact on several aspects of the production of scientific knowledge,
such as the division of tasks, work organisation, and choice of research prob-
lems that together constitute the core of the research process. In sociology of
science, it has been recognised that insight in the manner in which scientists
choose research problems can help in interpreting the dynamic character of
science. One of the positions put forward by Zuckerman (1978) and Gieryn
(1978) is that scientists, in their choice of problems worthy of research, fol-
low the lines that are imminent after they have chosen to follow a specific the-
ory. From the discussion on the setting of research agendas in toxicology, a
different picture emerges that does not suggest that the above insights are
wrong or mistaken but adds a condition to it.
The manner in which scientists relate to problems is a significant issue in
the Mertonian approach to science because theory accumulation is the ulti-
mate aim of science and therefore a relation between choice of research prob-
lems and choice of theory is important. Changing patterns in science are
related to new areas of theoretical excitement and, therefore, to the internal
history of such scientific areas (Zuckerman 1978, p. 85). These changes at the
field level are partly a consequence of scientists changing the problem sets on
which they work. By adding new problems and dropping old, scientists
migrate from one area to another. Because in this set of explanations, control
of problem sets is in the end internal to science, the question of how problems
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relate to external resources is ignored. The relation between problems and
resources can be regarded as one of the main issues in laboratory studies. In
Latour and Woolgar (1976), the activity of scientists is considered to be an
activity that attracts external resources and secures their future supply
according to a “credibility cycle” (p. 201). Fujimura (1987) argued that inter-
nal changes are intrinsically related to thewider social environment. Specific
research approaches require commitment of resources, which must be
secured from outside organisations (Fujimura 1987). To make this support
possible, these external organisations must become interested. In her per-
spective, which is close to Callon’s approach, external interests have to be
translated into the interests of the researchers (Fujimura 1987; Callon 1980,
pp. 197-219).
The analysis of applied sciences has led on one hand to a debate on the pre-
ferred mode of operation of scientific systems, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, and on the other hand, to discussions on the preferred ways to solve
social problems (Morone and Woodhouse 1986). In addition, the role of
the state in mediating between these two conflicting demands has been
analysed.5 However, such studies take a “helicopter” view of these relations.
Attention to regularities in integrative mechanisms at the level of actual
research is lacking. From the analysis of toxicology, the following more
detailed picture of the integration of science with policy, through problem
selection, is apparent.
Origins of Toxicology
A number of different concerns have shaped the field of toxicology over
the past two centuries. Attention to occupational problems in nineteenth-
century industrialisation was complemented by early regulation of health
risks of pesticides and drugs. The regulatory trajectory was completed by the
increasing attention toward environmental effects of chemicals in the second
half of the twentieth century, resulting in general rules for the admission of
new chemicals to the market. Currently, toxicology is a field of science and
practice that is concerned with the scientific evaluation of risks of chemicals
to humans and the environment. The societal importance of the field has
steadily increased in the past half century. Toxicology institutionalised in
connection with decision making on health and environmental problems.
Recently, this relationship has been referred to as a “shotgun wedding”
(Davis 1985) between environmental law and regulation and environmental
science. Science-forcing requirements have been introduced in the 1950s,
such as the zero-cancer-risk requirement formulated in the Delaney clause to
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the Food and Drug Act of 1956. In the 1970s, environmental laws authorised
agencies to take regulatory action on the basis of scientific inquiry (Davis
1985). The mechanisms through which these concerns have shaped toxicol-
ogy are slightly different with regard to national characteristics (Brickman,
Jasanoff, and Ilgen 1985) as well as practical questions (Jasanoff 1990). Inte-
gration of national, political, and juridical concerns takes place, leading to
localised fields that differ significantly in relevant dimensions influencing
the issues that concern toxicologists. This results in different domains, speci-
fied by social practices, such as occupational and environmental hygiene;
scientific disciplines, such as biochemistry, pathology and analytical chemis-
try; and national policy concerns. These variations result in a number of dif-
ferently structured opportunities for toxicology to operate in.
Increased government regulation to protect humans, animals, and the eco-
system from adverse effects led, during the past fifty years, to pressures on
toxicology to provide scientific data. The main social actors that are inter-
ested in data from toxicology are state agencies such as, in the United States,
the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency,
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration; in addition, indus-
try, mainly the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, has an active interest.
The primary interest of these audiences is the production of applicable
knowledge that is trustworthy enough to base policy and management deci-
sions on (Mukerji 1989).
The combination of various external demandsmentioned above induced a
research field based on practical questions, which are usually significantly
different from those in discipline-oriented research. Therefore, compromise
has to be sought between scientifically justifiable model systems and obser-
vations in real systems. For example, biologists with an interest in adverse
reactions of biological organisms to chemicals prefer to work with simple
model systems related to theoretical questions. The regulatory drive, a result
of frequent mishap in the field of drugs, pesticides, and chemical production,
formed a support system for scientists with various disciplinary backgrounds
that were willing to attack these messier problems. Thus, in the early days of
toxicology, scientists were attracted to research on practical questions not
directly related to the internal reputational system of science. External
nonscientific audiences had a need for knowledge that was increasingly
embedded in the context of binding regulatory rules. Both government agen-
cies and industry defined what the testing for adverse effects of chemicals
should be. Therefore, allocation of resources and the enhancement of local
reputations increasingly rewarded orientation toward questions of practice.6
The following story illustrates the interaction between regulation and sci-
entific research. In the 1960s, when toxicology was underdeveloped with
482 Science, Technology, & Human Values
 at Vrije Universiteit 34820 on April 5, 2011sth.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
regard to questions about effects of chemicals in ecosystems and other spe-
cies than humans, Rachel Carson’s (1962) book Silent Spring acted as a cata-
lyst for drawing public and government attention to this area. One instance of
this influence provides a vivid illustration of the processes involved. In Eng-
land, biologists at the Nature Conservancy were well aware of the problems
described by Carson. They lacked the support, however, to build a research
program to prove their suspicions. The publication of Carson’s book was
used to press the government into action. The biologists involved were care-
ful to introduce their own interests as necessarily linked to the state. “If the
government wanted to be in a position to assess accurately the emotional
biased generalisation made by both sides, there had to be much more
research” (Sheail 1985).
To achieve this goal, they organised a lobby behind the scenes and argued
in a way that was politically useful, though not necessarily targeting themost
damaging chemicals. An example is the emphasis put on the loss of wildlife
for hunting purposes based on accounts (Sheail 1985) of landowners.
In the opinion of the Conservancy’s deputy director, Barton Worthington, the
Conservancy could once again “afford to sit back and be dispassionate.” The
time was right for reassessment, and the Conservancy should seize the oppor-
tunity presented by “Silent Spring” to secure more resources so that an ade-
quate appraisal could be made. (Pp. 89-90)
While the core of modern toxicology is tied to the interests of the state and of
industry, these interests do not unequivocally dominate toxicology. Other
practical purposes have also formed the focus for organisation. To elucidate
the manner in which science and social problems are interrelated, I will use
regulatory toxicology and state-science interaction as important examples
here.
Increased attention to the adverse effects of chemicals on human and other
organisms gave rise both to increased facilities for regulatory research and to
growing interest in fundamental studies of mechanisms of toxic action. Not
only did the amount of toxicological testing expand, the range of effects stud-
ied also broadened. As a result of both types of changes, the increased span of
regulatory action and the increased attention from academic researchers, the
field has changed considerably (Johnston 1980) in a short period of time.
There can be little argument over the extent to which this research is con-
strained and directed by the political issues associated with risk determination
and control. It is then, par excellence, a field in which organisational pressures
and political objectives shape the selection, production and evaluations of sci-
entific knowledge and its study can contribute to the development of more
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comprehensive theories of the interaction between political and intellectual
aspects of the social reality which constitute science. (P. 104)
Two social processes that affect the conduct of scientific research warrant
closer attention, and they will be drawn from the case study of the develop-
ment of the Dutch field of toxicology. These are, first, the establishment of
local credibility and, second, the institutional mechanisms that subsequently
function to stabilise an area.
First, to determine the question whether toxicologists can be considered
competent to answer social questions, it is crucial to examine in which way
toxicologists can influence the precise definition of the problem for which
their involvement is required. Thus, both at an individual level as well as the
societal level, toxicologists depend on the ability to convince outside groups
of the essential role of toxicologists.
Second, with regard to reputational control, the origins of the discipline
and its links with social practice strongly suggest that its success or failure
will not be judged by improvement on or extension of elegant theory but by
the way in which social problems can be avoided or ameliorated. But such
processes are never easy or lead to clear-cut answers. Therefore, toxicolo-
gists are in a position to obtain resources when they establish credibility with
the social groups confronted with chemical hazards. Directly accessible
nonscientific audiences thus execute the reputational control of toxicological
research to a large extent. The discipline’s resource base is dependent on its
usefulness in addressing problems in society.
Problem Choice and Agenda Setting
In this section, I will delineate three mechanisms by which scientists can
relate their research abilitieswith external audiences; thesemechanisms have
implications that reach beyond previous discussions of problem choice in
science.
The first mechanism, used by scientists to integrate science and policy,
consists of a form of piggybacking on a social problem. In this variant, the
rhetoric of the arguments is that an audience can save money by spending it
on toxicology instead of spending it on cleanup.When cancer tests suggested
that formaldehyde was a possible cancer-causing chemical, public health
authorities needed to decide whether they would remove formaldehyde-
containing products from the market or remodel houses containing, for
example, chipboardwith formaldehyde base glue.As one of the toxicologists
(Groenewegen 1988) argued,
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I was doing those tests on acetaldehyde when publications appeared in 1980
about nasal cancers appearing in formaldehyde-exposed rats. In the same
period, we observed larynx tumours in hamsters. The newspapers were full of
rumours on formaldehyde gas in houses and it was argued that those houses
had to be rebuilt. I approached officials of the ministry and said to them “You
have got a problem with formaldehyde. We have the expertise. If we could
show that acetaldehyde does the same—and we already have indications that
acetaldehyde induces tumours in rats—maybewewill be able to relieve you of
this pressure.” (personal communication, V. J. Feron, 7 August 1985)
Joining the policy bandwagon in this style affects policy options quite dra-
matically without affecting the research itself. It is therefore a boundary
action directed at attracting resources to specific areas already in existence.
The mechanism is exploited in various forms, but usually scientists are quite
frank about their intentions and gains.
The secondmechanism is the redefinition of an important social problem.
In one of the toxicological research groups, immune-related toxicological
research was conducted based on a few specific problems of pesticides,
which were known to be caused by interaction with the immune system. The
researchers actively tried to locate external problems for which their research
would show the necessity to use immunotoxicological tests to prevent prob-
lems. When about 400 people died in Spain as a consequence of consuming
contaminated olive oil, a relation was established between this problem,
which lacked a chemical explanation, and immune toxicology.7 The research
group saw this as a problem—based on the reported symptoms—of the
immune system and was very vocal in securing money to solve the mystery.
The legitimacy of their action—they themselves argued—should be judged
by the acceptance of their immunological explanation (personal communica-
tion, W. Seinen, 13 August 1983). It should be considered successful if their
explanation was accepted socially and politically. In this sense, success
would lead to redefinition of the problem in the terms of immunotoxicology,
narrowing down the possible causation chain and involving scientificwork in
solving future mysteries.
Redefinition changes the content of a specific problem in an intricateman-
ner. This mechanism focuses on positioning science in such a way that a link
is established (cognitively, rationally) with an existing type of explanation.
This mechanism also allows important external problems to be used as lever-
age within the field itself.
Third, an important mechanism consists of organised interactions
between toxicologists and policy makers on relevant issues. This results in a
hybrid scientific-political agenda. An example is the start of Dutch environ-
mental toxicology. A hybrid group of toxicologists and policy makers
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founded the CNB (the committee on the assessment of side effects of pesti-
cides) (Groenewegen 1987). The CNB provides a clear example of inter-
weaving scientific and sociopolitical organisation along lines neither entirely
centred on science nor on social concerns. The crystallisation point proved to
be the concern for the environmental consequences of pesticides. One of the
original starting points lay in the outcomes of research on the appearance of
pesticides in certain disorders of water-related animals (mussels and birds).
Concerned scientists and experts working in various ministries and compa-
nies came together and started theCNBon an informal basis. From this infor-
mal basis, anchoring points in the bureaucracy were constructed. In this con-
genial forum, negotiations on essential policy measures took place next to
assessing the need to do additional research. In this process, both the scien-
tific agenda and the political agenda were determined. Regardless of the
name of the committee, it became clear that only some aspects of the so-
called side effects of pesticides were thought to be important. Thus,
ecotoxicological research was increasingly directed at other environmental
contaminants, while the effect of pesticides on farmworkers were excluded.
Thus, in the course of a fewyears, side effects of pesticideswere no longer the
central issue, and concern shifted to the effects of chemicals on the environ-
ment. This third mechanism demonstrates a form of collective, mutual struc-
turing of agendas. A committee secures the resulting social mechanism—in
fact establishing a place formore permanent exchangewhen compared to the
other two examples above. The interaction still serves the processing of inter-
actions between two different worlds (research and policy), but the roles of
the experts are not neatly divided along these lines. As a result, the problems
of research are directly put on the social agenda, and vice versa, social prob-
lems are directly related to research agendas.
Structured patterns of interaction between scientists and nonscientific
groups involved in agenda-setting processes are not limited to the national
level, a case in point being the complex of interactions surrounding regula-
tion.8 The regulatory agenda is determined largely outside the direct confines
of local politics and local science. The influence toxicologists have on the
regulatory agenda is largely indirect. Representatives from government
agencies, industry, and academia meet regularly with toxicologists, and it is
in such situations that mutual structuring of policy and research agendas
takes place.
The first two mechanisms show a selection of problems, which not only
takes the scientific merit but also the social importance of problems into
account. The individual actions discussed here occur repeatedly and imply a
close interrelation between social and scientific problem setting. The impor-
tant point is that the regularity of such interaction is much greater than the
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microsociological analysis of science and technology suggests. The way in
which coupling between the two areas occurs has been highlighted by the
third mechanism. The actions in the institutional area between scientific and
other organisations can be studied by giving attention to intermediate institu-
tions, such as committees.
Generally, scientists cumadvisers position themselves inways that ensure
involvement in both the definition and redefinition of a social problemaswell
as the determination of research agendas. The consequence of this behaviour
suggests that the effectiveness of the scientific research will not be judged by
interested colleagues (peer review) but by their perceived contribution to the
solution of social problems. Defining a problem as a scientific/toxicological
problem invokes expert judgment from the start and therefore ensures the
involvement of toxicologists. Therefore, toxicology is effectively bound to
external audiences. The definition of the scientific subject of toxicology has
to be linked to the manner in which the social world defines problems with
chemicals. When on this social agenda, toxicologists—to support their field
of inquiry and training—secure resources, the focus may increasingly shift
toward an internal reputational structure. The general strategy of toxicolo-
gists may be described as attentiveness to solutions to social problems of
audiences, such as firms and government agencies, which cannot be solved
with their own administrative or commercial knowledge and competence.
The role of toxicologists for specific audiences therefore resides in the capac-
ity of toxicologists to provide workable solutions for specific problems on a
regular basis. Subsequently, much of the process of interaction on social and
scientific issues takes place within a more general framework of institutional
and broader reputational structures.
Reputational Control in Toxicology
In a field connected with social problems, an emphasis on scientific qual-
ity reinforces certain positions in the field at the expense of others. This prob-
lem has mostly been signalled from a societal perspective. By stimulating
scientific research, fundamental solutions for problems would be reached,
and local tinkering can be countered (Majone 1982). The emphasis in science
studies on the functioning of peer review and reputations exemplifies this
perceptive (Whitley 1984a). However, the discussion on scientific reputation
puts far too much emphasis on the community aspect of scientific fields
based on the positions of the sum of individual scientists in direct relation to
their specialty or scientific field. In my opinion, the mediating influence of
institutional surroundings are neglected. The organisational context has a far-
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reaching effect on the reputation relevant for the scientist in his or her local
field. The effect of reputational control in relation to the worldwide scientific
fields is effectively mediated through these institutional positions to varying
degrees. Furthermore, while the role of individual reputation as a resource
might be important, at the level of research opportunities, financial resources
are far more important. The division of such resources in fields such as toxi-
cology takes place in a direct interaction with relevant audiences. I will dis-
cuss themechanism of reputational control by nonscientific audiences on the
basis of two (semicommercial and public) institutional positions I encoun-
tered in my case study. These examples could be augmented by reference to
specific university groups from the same case study.
TNO-CIVO is a Dutch laboratory for food and nutrition research. The
institute is partly financed by the government but earns most of its budget by
contract and project money.9 From a modest beginning, the institute has
grown to a modest research facility with a couple of dozen fundamentally
trained scientists. An increasing part of their research for external audiences
is also promoted as scientific research. The question is how scientists are con-
strained in their work by organisational goals and culture and how they inte-
grate changing availability of external resources and audience interests into
their scientific work.
The commercial attitude of the institute’s first directors resulted in an
institute that relied partly on contract research.10 Especially good contacts
with industries in the food sector were established. This attitude of the man-
agement made its work dependent on changing industrial interests and its
willingness to finance research. The general problems of industrywith chem-
icals, the perceived opportunities by the CIVO management, and the avail-
ability of infrastructure led to the start of toxicological research and toxicity
testing. CIVO could pursue toxicity testing and research because it was capa-
ble of organising food research on a commercial basis, it had the basic facili-
ties for running animal tests, and it demonstrated willingness to serve indus-
try as a customer.11
By following industrial needs, a broader basis for toxicity studies was cre-
ated. This institutional strategy, based on resource dependence on industry,
thus strengthened the research infrastructure.With these resources, toxicolo-
gists could acquire advanced equipment and support staff, which could, of
course, also be put to other uses. Contract research requirements have led to
expansion. This involved routine work but has also required a differentiation
of expertise. Research done within the department changed considerably
during this period. From beginnings in food research and toxicity testing, the
programme has evolved toward large toxicological research projects, some
of which are funded from bodies that have a principal role in the support of
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fundamental research. These various changes stimulated new research
themes and suggested linkswith financial sources other than industry.Under-
lying it is the notion that contract research and scientific work need to rein-
force each other. Thus, research was increasingly legitimated in both the sci-
entific and industrial contexts. The new type of research that was organised
consisted of projects centred on certain themes in which resources were
sought to support a preconceived research plan.
Foreign industries were, and are, prominent among the customers of
CIVO, although relations with Dutch industry have always balanced this.
“The value of toxicological research increases with the reputation of the
research-institute. This reputation increases with the fact that foreign firms
also award contracts and thereby recognise the work of the institute” (De
Groot 1974).
When customers are satisfied by the reports produced and public health
authorities accept the reports, there is a good chance that new contracts will
result for the institute. These contracts are not only obtained from the original
customer, but industrial toxicologists have frequent contacts with each other
and recommend thework done by contract institutes such as CIVO. The links
with industry can thus be seen as providing a reputational structure that is, at
the same time, nonlocal and nonscientific.
Change in the areas of interest of industry has an effect on the type of stud-
ies that are done, leading to gradual transitions in the types of problems
worked on.
When you are working with a customer and he is content about your work on,
let us say food additives, and he wants a pesticide to be tested, then you don’t
say no. And the next time he asks for an environmental chemical to be tested,
you also agree to do the tests. (Personal communication, H. B. W. M. Koëter,
24 September 1985).
In this way, not only the scope of chemicals that could be handled
increased incrementally but the area of attention shifted. In CIVO, research
on food-related chemicals gradually gave way to the testing of chemicals for
a variety of industries. However, such resources were acquired at the price of
constraints. The contract relation between industry and the institute ensured
that test results are owned by industry. This fact constrains the possibility of
using results from tests in the science system. The strategic choices made by
industry directed the toxicologists who needed contract money. The overall
interests of the chemical industry changed, and this change encompassed
variations in the number of projects developed as well as the types of
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chemicals involved. Their willingness to make new investments determined
the level of resources available.
The second example concerns toxicological research in the RIVM (State
Institute for Public Health and Environmental Hygiene). The relationship
between scientists and state officials relevant to this institution has been built
up over the years, and themanner inwhich it has been structured depended on
the stage of development of toxicology. Currently, the state provides all the
resources of the RIVM, and relations with ministries are both crucial and
constraining. The RIVM is not a contract laboratory for the ministries
involved with health policy, but it is part of the ministries of Welfare Public
Health andCulture (WVC) andHousing, Physical Planning and the Environ-
ment (VROM). The relation of the RIVM to the ministries is complicated.
The RIVMdirector is represented at the highest political level in theministry
and is therefore able to influence health and environmental policies. How-
ever, the officials of the ministry influence RIVM decisions. Officially, they
have to agree on the use of 80 percent of the research capacity; consequently,
theministriesWVC andVROM form themain audiences for RIVM research
plans.12 Other ministries that have a relationship with the RIVM do not have
such an immediate influence on the research programme.13 This structural
position of the RIVM implies that research efforts are judged by audiences
that are in fixed relation with the scientists in comparison to CIVO discussed
above. The manner in which these interactions evolved over time should tell
us something about the manner in which reputational control is exerted.
In the early period, the problem of chemicals in the working and living
environment of humanswas not recognised by the state as a concern thatwar-
ranted much investment. Scientists had to find ways to raise this interest.
Later, when policy interest was present and relations with the RIVM became
structured, a different sort of interaction resulted, and this can be systemati-
cally related to RIVM tasks. The method used by toxicologists to interest
government in the early period consisted of creating alliances with other
experts outside their own laboratory. Contactswith industrial toxicologists in
the 1950s and 1960s supplied resources for government scientists. Industrial
contracts provided the scientists with some financial means for their
research: They were typically used to expand animal testing facilities and for
the acquisition of specialised technical equipment (personal communication,
H. Van Genderen Utrecht, 6 August 1985; 2 December 1985). The contribu-
tion in the formof research problemswas perhapsmore important than that of
the link with industrial toxicologists. Toxicologists, to gain insight into the
intricate details of safety testing, used new chemicals from industry. This
experience, in turn, provided real problems on which fundamental research
was based. For example, research observations on carcinogenicity in an
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industrial chemical led to research in carcinogenesis. Generally, research on
industrial chemicals was used to impress government officials with the need
to regulate chemicals. In short, safety evaluation under contract with industry
was used as a lever to interest the government (personal communication, H.
Van Genderen Utrecht, 6 August 1985; 2 December 1985). “The conscious-
ness of the government with regard to toxicological research was raised, and
the number of relevant questions from the government grew. The perfor-
mance of contract testing became therefore less necessary” (personal com-
munication, H. Van Genderen, 2 December 1985).
A second example illustrates the manner in which government attention
can be attracted. To strengthen the capacity of the RIVM to tackle potential
health problems caused by pesticides, the toxicologists set up alliances with
scientists from other government institutes (e.g., the quality control bureau
and the plant protection service) (Flipse 1969; personal communication,
H. Van Genderen Utrecht, 6 August 1985; 2 December 1985). In the 1950s,
the RIVM scientists took the initiative to draw together differently located
scientists and some state officials to form a committee, the Committee on
Phytopharmacy. This committee thus consisted of researchers and audiences
and evaluated the health hazards of pesticides and agreed on spraying rules
and pesticide residue levels on an informal basis. It was also active in an area
that cut across the boundaries of the ministries dealing with health and agri-
culture.14 Despite the lack of formal legislation, the committee dealtwith pes-
ticide problems, and the officials of the ministries responsible for agriculture
and health did not appreciate this method of operating. These officials
deemed it essential that a law on pesticides be introduced, in which the
PhytopharmacyCommitteewas given official authority to evaluate the safety
of newpesticides (personal communication,H.VanGenderenUtrecht, 6August
1985; Flipse 1969).
The functionaries saw toxicology as a way to deal with hazards by doing a few
routine experiments. This attitude changed through the influence of the coop-
eration in the Committee on Phytopharmacy. Some of the civil servants devel-
oped a keen insight into the necessity of developing toxicological research.
This new attitudemade it possible to obtain sufficientmeans for toxicity testing
and toxicological research. (Personal communication, H. vanGenderen, 6August
1985)
This episode shows the mechanism described in the previous section at
work at the institutional level: Officials and scientists together structure the
legislation and its content. In the formative phases, the insights of the scien-
tists, mediated through joint committees, play an important role.
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Both examples demonstrate the role of external groups in establishing an
institutional reputation for toxicologists. With interests supported by exter-
nal groups, research tasks envisaged at the working level become official
tasks of the institute. They pervasively shape the relationships from the scien-
tists with the ministry and with other social groups.
Conclusion
We have seen the embedded character of problem choice and institutional
as well as reputational control in toxicology. Critical elements of both pro-
cesses normally considered internal to science are shared with external
groups. This sharing leads to hybrid structures.
Problem choice can follow theoretical lines whenever agreements with
audiences allow science to proceed on a research agenda entirely set within
the scientific community. The growth of toxicology suggests that from a
practical and pragmatic start, increasingly more abstract and generalised
research can find a place in the field. In developing such new activities, it is
simpler to import knowledge, methods, and scientists from basic scientific
fields. Through this mechanism, new fields that are added benefit from the
relative autonomy of separate strands of research such as biochemistry. Basic
scientific research on problems becomes the preferred solutionwhenever sci-
entific fields are sufficiently detached from social concerns that they can set
their own research agendas. However, within the overall framework of sci-
ence, attention to social goals remains essential; that is, social usefulness, at a
general level, allows for internal agendas at the field level.
The norms and standards of science are subject to changewhen clients and
not scientific colleagues primarily judge the outcomes of research work. A
difference exists in this respect between the early phases in Dutch toxicology
and the later phases. In the first phase, research work and advisory duties
were nearly inseparable. In the second phase, different functions of the arena,
such as advisory work, policy formulation, and research, became separated.
This division of tasks created strongly coupled groups: one of civil servants
with toxicological training, an advisory establishment, and a group of scien-
tists within research organisations. The civil servants draw up the policy
agenda; the scientific advisers provide the civil servantswith information and
sanction their measures; the research workers are, in some cases, visibly
present with the advisers and the civil servants in committees that coordinate
research. Common practice also provided a crystallisation point for interna-
tional scientific development. International scientific development provides
groups in a local scientific community with increased status and enhanced
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legitimation. Thus, scientific communication in problem-oriented fields
serves local groups in their own network. Localised scientific interest can,
through long-term integration in international scientific publications and
other means of exchange such as scientific associations, strengthen the posi-
tion of scientists. Consequently, scientists can be regarded as impartial allies
of the government or industry in solving problems. In hybrid fields, social
recognition of problems, problem definition in the scientific sphere, and
resource and audience structures merge.
That scientific autonomy has a negotiated character is shown to be rele-
vant by others. Boundary conditions under which scientific research is per-
formed are negotiable. When such boundaries are established, research
organisations and audiences constitute a loosely knit system that is supported
by multiple roles for all actors in the field. Audiences perform a role in pro-
viding resources and the legitimation of resources, and local actions by scien-
tists are legitimated as contributions to problem definition and solution. The
autonomy of scientists at specific locations in the field depends more on the
links from these positions to other positions than the intellectual character of
thework. In such hybrid scientific fields, processes of negotiation link choice
of research problems and the availability of resources.Hybrid evaluation pro-
cedures shelter scientific research from too pervasive intrusion by outside
social groups, enabling access to scientific resources and, at the same time,
blocking easy access of competing scientific groups to specialised resources.
In one sense, scientists use their science as a resource in the negotiation with
outsiders (Latour 1987). The manner in which they proceed politically with
this task is by making science opaque for outsiders. Thus, earlier findings on
similar fields can be amended.
Salter has argued that the public aspect of toxicology and related disci-
plines, labelled as mandated science, poses a paradox for its practitioners.
Their work is both highly public in the sense of being justified publicly, and
less-than-public by the normal canons of science such as peer review (Salter
1988). Thus, mandated science often relies on an idealised picture of the sci-
entific enterprise. Policy makers need science to be an idealised enterprise
(e.g., value free, objective, independent of social interests, and highly ratio-
nal to rely on science in the policy process). According to Salter, regulators
and others in mandated science use the ideal picture of science to defend the
role of science in regulation and proposed regulatory activities. In chaining in
some activities and consequently avoiding interest group negotiations, scien-
tific regulators are able to control some of the overt influence peddling and
interest group negotiations that would otherwise have occurred (Salter 1988,
pp. 197-98; Van Eijndhoven and Groenewegen 1991; Collingridge and
Reeve 1986). Thus, the autonomy negotiated by the scientists allows the
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scientific research process to proceed within its own setting. Externally, the
autonomy serves two purposes. It provides a role for scientists in the institu-
tional setting around regulators and other decision makers, apart from other
knowledge sources. Scientists are purposefully engaged in their roles as
judge on facts and issues. Second, the engagement of scientists enables pol-
icy makers and regulators to disengage themselves from some of the social
controversy surrounding the decision making on environmental and health
hazards. To fulfil this role well, it is essential to embed the scientist’s role in a
process for scientific qualification, which only succeedswhen the experts are
engaged in scientific research. Therefore, research with a more global char-
acter also develops in institutional settings that are strongly supported by pol-
icy makers. This evolution of relative autonomous research in such institu-
tional research settings as demonstrated in the emergence of Dutch
toxicology is essential to relate the scientists to international science. Interna-
tional science provides the essential resource for both the scientists and regu-
lators. From this conclusion, it can be inferred that development of applied
scientific fields might lead to international scientific fields that help to set
experts apart as scientists. They thus appear to be less the colonised group of
experts that serves thewishes of policymakers as suggested by the concept of
“epistemic drift” used by Elzinga (1988). The public function of toxicology
is dependent on control by mixed fora. In the case of toxicology, it is not so
much an existing discipline that bends to relevance and accountability pres-
sures but in institutional, social, and cognitive terms, a separate effort is cre-
ated. This effort has not only a social basis in a separate group of scientists
working in different laboratories but it also has a cognitive dimension. Prob-
lems for policy makers cannot be mapped on a one-to-one basis on existing
disciplinary research fields. It requires translation not only of the social but
also of the cognitive dimension of the problem. The social engagement and
the orientation to the solution of policy problems require amutual structuring
of policy and research agendas to arrive in this state. Thus, toxicology can be
called a hybrid science in a double sense both cognitive and social (quality
control and agenda setting).
The emergence of toxicology can be regarded as an example of a series of
transformational steps in the societal role of science reflected in the analysis
of the tension between scientific research and the demands of the social con-
text in social studies of science. The first research and analytical efforts sug-
gested a transition of the scientific research effort, from a separate social
activity deemed necessary to establish a solid basis, to the development of
applied research efforts. This transition has echoed in the concept of finalis-
ation the Starnberg group in the 1970s (Böhme, Van den Daele, and Krohn
1973). The current discussion on the character of science vis-à-vis
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application pointsmore to the effective transformation of science to a broadly
used form of inquiry to support a wide variety of decisions, developments,
and the solution of social problems (Gibbons et al. 1994).
Notes
1. Elzinga (1988) discussed three aspects of change in scientific research: (1) free flow of
information diminishes; (2) research agendas get skewed in favor of particular social interests;
and (3) researchers drift to commercial spheres or governmental stables. This argument is a nor-
mative one, and evidence for these assertions is lacking both froma political and critical perspec-
tive: “When research parks crop up, technology parks, sponsorship, and new university-
industrial relations are put in place, it is mostly without much knowledge about the possible
effects on the research system” (p. 5). Elzinga suggested two threats to science: (1) subversion of
the specific “cognitive” or societal mission of disciplinary research and (2) quality control of the
products of scientific work is diminished.
2. Historical examples have been discussed that are based on changes in the university
research system (Geiger 1988;Blume1987). It has been pointed out that academic researchers in
the early twentieth century already held different opinions on the relation they should have with
social constituencies (Rosenberg 1976; Servos 1981).
3. Cozzens (1986) argued that efforts to steer science have been neglected in science stud-
ies. In the theme issue that follows this introduction, resource availability linked to growth char-
acteristics of scientific fields is used as the most dominant way of looking at these processes.
While this is the dominant indicator used, in itself, the growth of knowledge is not necessarily a
useful measuring device for assessment of the interaction between audiences and scientists. The
mechanisms of interaction are but mostly only mentioned in passing. For example, Gillmor
(1986) suggested for ionospheric physics a difference in the manner in which science is influ-
enced by external organizationswhen these organizations choose funding people versus projects
or problems.
4. For biotechnology, this has been analysed as one of the reasons for increased interaction
with industry (Kenney 1986). Biomedical sciences also are strongly influenced by the changing
interests of external funding agencies (Studer and Chubin, 1980). Agricultural sciences have
been suggested to be particularly strongly bound to practice (Busch and Lacy, 1983).
5. The importance of “independent” scientific research and subsequent emphasis by scien-
tists as well as policy makers on quality research has been analyzed in the framework of govern-
ment support for science by Mukerji (1989).
6. Toxicologists are of course aware of this relationship, as the following quote demon-
strates: “Regulation is thus an exploiter of toxicology; it relies on this scientific discipline to
make social decisions. But regulators are notmerely consumers of information that toxicologists
generate. Regulatory programs have provided a major impetus for improvements in toxicologic
studies” (Klaassen, Amdur, and Doull 1986, 34).
7. Every expert in the public health system soon converged on adulterated oil as the caus-
ative factor. Conclusive proof of what chemical factor in the oil was responsible was lacking,
however.
8. One of the interesting aspects Iwill not go into detail on here is that regulatory toxicology
would be an interesting field for a more detailed study of how social and scientific interaction is
used to establish the essential steps for a good assessment. My suspicion, based on what I know
of it, would be that it is a process characterized by sedimented layers of knowledge requirements
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that were a result of either new problems to be solved or new scientific specialties that wanted to
stake a claim in toxicology, some of which is outdated and most of which is a reflection of spe-
cific social problems with chemicals during the past forty years.
9. Contract research as a distinct form of scientific work has received only sparse attention
in the sociology of science literature.
10. In this respect, it differed fromotherTNO (TNO-CIVO is aDutch laboratory for food and
nutrition research) institutes that were financed to a much larger extent by government money
(up to 100 percent in some health- and defense-related institutes).
11. The decision to start toxicologywas facilitated by the existence of a new building for ani-
mal experiments at CIVO (personal communication, A. P. de Groot, 20May 1986; V. J. Feron,
7 August 1985).
12. The ministry had a small amount of money in the 1970s that it could spend outside the
RIVM (State Institute for Public Health and Environmental Hygiene). However this money was
taken away with the budget cuts in the 1980s. Accordingly, the ministry had to influence the
research plans of the RIVM to get done the research it thought necessary (personal communica-
tion, F. W. van der Kreek, 1984).
13. The influence of political arrangements on the development of the RIVM can be seen in
the cessation of research on occupational toxicology when the Directorate General of Labour
was organized under another ministry. The ministry that at the moment shares responsibility
with Welfare Public Health and Culture, that of Housing, Physical Planning, and the Environ-
ment, is also committed to the RIVM but has less influence on internal policy.
14. The scientists from various institutes were acting on the belief that they had to take
responsibility themselves.
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